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Stepping Back and Adding Perspective
A Reply to Verena Gottschling
Jonathan Schooler
In this reply, I circumvent (some might say dodge) a number of Gottschling’s fine-
grained comments by stepping back and reviewing the key points of the three ma-
jor sections of my target paper in light of her more general concerns. I first con-
sider Gottschling’s primary criticism of the first section of my paper, namely that
insights that might emerge from considering the perspective shifting associated
with reversible images do not apply in the context of differences between first and
third-person perspectives. Although I concede there are differences in the meaning
of “perspective” in conceptual and perceptual domains, I argue that the common
element of a reliance on a frame-of-reference is sufficient to make the analogy
helpful. I contend that a necessary element in overcoming the limitations of partic-
ular perspectives in both conceptual and perceptual domains is attempting to con-
sider alternative vantages. This approach is then used to justify the tack of the
next two sections: considering first-person experience from the vantage of third-
person science and considering third-person science from the vantage of first-per-
son experience. I note that Gottschling is largely sympathetic to the broad goals
of the second section of my paper, and observe that her major concern with the
construct of experiential consciousness emerges from her burdening it with unwar-
ranted assumptions. I use her constructive suggestion for the need for further de-
velopment of the notion of meta-awareness as a springboard for introducing a pre-
viously overlooked element (experiential monitoring) that may be useful for ex-
plaining how people can knowingly monitor performance without explicit verbal
re-representation. Finally, I consider Gottschlings’ view that the third section fails
to add to the value of the paper. Although I acknowledge that the arguments in
the second section stand independently, I argue that discussion of how science
can inform experience gains greater balance by also considering how experience
informs science. I close by challenging the view that knowledge gained from sci-
ence necessarily trumps that gained by experience, and conclude that it remains a
worthy goal to seek a meta-perspective that accommodates both first- and third-
person perspectives without reducing one to the other. 
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1 Introduction
Reviewing a commentary on one’s work, even one
as  thoughtful  as  that  provided  by  Gottschling
(this collection), is much like viewing a close-up
picture  of  one’s  face  on a  large  high-definition
screen; every blemish seems patently visible and
appears to overshadow even the most genuine of
expressions. The temptation is to pull out one’s
metaphoric Photoshop and doctor up every im-
perfection. There is another option, however, and
that is to step back and consider whether from a
broader perspective the blemishes are really as
disfiguring as they might initially appear. 
Inspired  by  this  analogy,  I  will  not  at-
tempt to rebut all of Gottschling’s consistently
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incisive remarks about my paper. Rather I will
use this essay as an opportunity to step back
and review the broad strokes of my arguments
in light of Gottschling’s more general concerns.
In so doing, I hope to demonstrate that while
Gottschling offers a number of insightful sugges-
tions for clarification and elaboration, the gen-
eral  logic  of  my arguments remain largely in-
tact.  Nevertheless,  Gottschling’s critique offers
an excellent opportunity to clarify some points
that may have been lost in the expanse of my
initial paper.
2 Reflections on section 21: Applying 
perspective shifts to conceptualizing 
human experience from the first- versus
third-person perspective
My paper opens with the contention that seem-
ingly opposing arguments can often reflect al-
ternative vantages of a larger meta-perspective
from which both views can be understood. I il-
lustrate this point using the example of revers-
ible images that can be seen as corresponding to
two entirely different objects depending on one’s
perspective.  I  argue that when one recognizes
that both vantages are true from their particu-
lar perspective, one gains an understanding of
the larger context (i.e., a meta-perspective). Al-
though most of my examples are perceptual il-
lustrations, I suggest that there is a close cor-
respondence between the processes involved in
perspective taking in perceptual and conceptual
domains, and that an appreciation of meta-per-
spectives  in  the  perceptual  domain  may  help
the formulation of meta-perspectives in the con-
ceptual domain. In the spirit of this argument I
suggest that the long-standing debate between
approaches that emphasize the subjective first-
person perspective of experience and those that
emphasize the objective third-person perspect-
ive of science, may be akin to debating which
direction the dancer is rotating in the spinning
dancer illusion (see figure 6 in Schooler this col-
lection).  In  both  cases,  it  simply  depends  on
your perspective. Taken from the perspective of
1 The paper begins with a very brief introduction that is numbered
section  1.  As  a  result  the  first  major  section  of  the  paper  is
numbered section 2.
the individual, understanding consciousness ne-
cessarily invites a reliance on introspection and
first-person analysis. Taken from the perspect-
ive of conventional third-person science, under-
standing consciousness necessarily requires ob-
jectively  observable  facts  (e.g.,  behaviors,
physiological responses) that can be derived in-
dependently  of  any  single  individuals’  experi-
ence
I  argue  that  both  of  these  views  have
merit,  that  both  researchers  and  schools  of
thought have debated (often vehemently) about
which of these two vantages is more appropri-
ate, and that part of the heat of this contro-
versy may stem from people’s disinclination to
switch back and forth between perspectives and
thereby gain a larger view that treats neither as
decisively superior.
Gottschling rejects the notion that the al-
ternative perspectives afforded by reversible im-
ages has relevance to conceptualizing the chal-
lenges of reconciling first- and third-person per-
spectives. Her difficulty with this analogy stems
(at least in part) from her view that the mean-
ing of “perspective” in these two contexts does
not align. As she puts it: “Because it rests on a
purely  metaphorical  use  of  ‘perspective’,  the
analogy does not go through” (Gottschling this
collection, p. 18). To be sure there are signific-
ant  differences  between  the  meaning  of  “per-
spective”  in  the  context  of  perceptual  experi-
ence, such as reversible images, and conceptual
ideas, such as the difference between first- and
third-person  approaches  to  the  study  of  con-
sciousness. However, I argue that there are some
deep  parallels  between  the  meanings  of  “per-
spective” in these two contexts that make the
analogy a useful one. I’ll begin by considering
the broader issue of the parallels between per-
ceptual  and  conceptual  perspectives  and  then
the more specific question of how these parallels
might usefully apply to the conceptual distinc-
tion  between first-  and third-person  perspect-
ives.
Critically, in both perceptual and concep-
tual  contexts  “perspective”  is  defined  by  a
frame-of-reference that determines how the con-
stituent elements are understood and related to
one  another,  as  well  as  which  elements  are
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taken as central and which as more peripheral.
In perceptual contexts, the frame-of-reference is
defined in terms of the assignment of spatial ar-
rangements;  i.e.,  what  is  to  the  left  and  the
right, what is in the foreground and background
etc. In conceptual contexts, the frame-of-refer-
ence is  defined in terms of  the assignment of
conceptual  arrangements;  i.e.;  which  elements
are conceptually closer or further apart, which
are more essential and which more peripheral.
In both cases, frame-of-reference can have pro-
found effects as evidenced by the reversible im-
age research in perception (Chambers &  Reis-
berg 1992)  and research on  cognitive  framing
(Tversky &  Kahneman 1981)  in  cognition.  A
further striking parallel between perceptual and
conceptual  perspectives  is  that  they  both  be-
come easily entrenched. When one watches the
spinning dancer (figure 6) it is very difficult to
recognize that at any time she can be seen as
facing in one of  two different directions.  In a
very similar way, when one works on a concep-
tual problem it is very easy to interpret it in a
particular way that creates a “mental set” that
can impede its solution. There is even a com-
mon cognitive ability (Schooler & Melcher 1995;
see also,  Wiseman et al. 2011) for overcoming
the mental sets associated with solving concep-
tual problems (e.g., insight problems) and per-
ceptual problems (e.g., recognizing out-of-focus
pictures). In short, perceptual reversible images
elegantly illustrate a fundamental aspect of not
just  perception  but  of  human cognition  more
generally;  namely,  that  we  routinely  consider
things (be they objects or ideas) within the con-
text of a particular frame-of-reference (be that
frame  perceptual  or  conceptual),  and  we  can
have  a  very  hard  time  reconsidering  those
things from a different perspective.
Even if it is appropriate to draw a parallel
between the meaning of “perspective” in percep-
tual and conceptual contexts, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the analogy can be extended
to the particular conceptual problem of distin-
guishing  between  the  first-  and  third-person
perspective approaches. But I maintain that it
is in fact particularly applicable in this context.
The essence of the distinction between first- and
third-person perspectives has to do with one’s
frame-of-reference.  If  one  considers  conscious-
ness from a first-person perspective, one is un-
derstanding it in relationship to one’s own per-
sonal experience, taking subjectivity as the fore-
ground and objective reality as the background.
One is considering consciousness through one’s
own experience, and grounding assumptions on
what is real and important on the basis of that
personal  subjective  vantage.  In  contrast,  a
third-person  perspective  takes  the  objective
world as the frame-of-reference. Personal experi-
ences that cannot be independently verified are
therefore suspect and inferences must be drawn,
as  they are  in  all  of  science,  on  the basis  of
people’s measurable behaviors and physiological
responses.  In my view,  it  is  no accident  that
these  two  approaches  to  thinking  about  con-
sciousness  have  historically  been  described  in
terms of differences in  perspective  as they self-
evidently  entail  thinking  about  consciousness
from distinctly different frames-of-reference. 
In short, I maintain that the notion of dis-
tinct conflicting perspectives akin to those asso-
ciated with perceptual  reversible  images aptly
applies to many conceptual distinctions, but es-
pecially apply when it comes to characterizing
the objective/subjective divide. The corollary of
this claim is the possibility that, like the altern-
ative perspectives of reversible images, the ob-
jective/subjective  divide  may  be  usefully  in-
formed  by  recognizing  that  both  perspectives
represent  equally  meaningful  interpretations
that cannot be reduced to one another, but may
be better  understood from a meta-perspective
that acknowledges the larger context in which
they are both embedded.
In my view, the importance of the distinct
perspectives  that  emerge  from  alternative
frames-of-reference simply cannot be overstated.
In addition to its self-evident effects in the con-
text  of  perception,  frames-of-reference  are  a
powerful determinant of the actions that people
take  in  important  real-life  situations.  For  ex-
ample, doctors’ prescriptions of how to treat an
epidemic  is  profoundly  influenced  by  whether
the treatment is framed in terms of lives saved
or lives lost even when it corresponds to pre-
cisely the same scenario (Tversky & Kahneman
1981).  In  physics,  fundamental  breakthroughs
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have  repeatedly  taken  place  as  a  function  of
changes in scientists’ frame-of-reference. For ex-
ample, Newton’s laws of gravity emerged when
he  realized  that  the  same  frame-of-reference
that applies to forces on the ground equally ap-
plies  to  the  motion  of  the  heavens  (Westfall
1980). Einstein’s special theory of relativity was
fostered by his replacement of the notion of an
absolute frame-of-reference with a frame-of-ref-
erence defined relative to the observer (2001).
Given the significance of perspective and frame-
of-reference in other contexts it stands to reason
that  something  so  salient  as  whether  one  is
thinking  about  consciousness  from  their  own
perspective or from the objective perspective of
science should profoundly impact the questions
that they ask and the answers that they reach. 
In the case of reversible images, the best
way to understand how they can correspond to
two so entirely distinct yet self-consistent rep-
resentations is  to practice alternating between
vantages. Although at first it is very difficult to
see  how the  spinning  dancer  alternatively  ro-
tates in two different directions,  with practice
one comes to appreciate the two vantages that
the image affords, and thus to understand why
her direction changes. The primary goal of my
paper is to explore the hypothesis that a deeper
understanding of the subjective/objective divide
can emerge in a similar fashion. By thoroughly
considering each vantage from the perspective
of the other, it is hoped that a meta-perspective
will emerge that recognizes the logical consist-
ency of  each,  while  not  attempting to reduce
either one to the other. 
Gottschling suggests that my emphasis on
“meta-perspective” is  an unnecessary strategic
move that ultimately detracts from the primary
value of my paper. Part of her difficulty with
the meta-perspective emphasis may arise from
my inadequately situating the second section of
my paper in the context of this construct, and
the seeming equation of meta-perspective with
non-reductionism in the third section. However,
the value of considering alternative perspectives
in overcoming the limitations that can emerge
when one solely considers a single vantage has
merit regardless of whether one ascribes to any
of the ontological speculations I suggest in the
third section of my paper. Independent of the
conclusions that one derives, there seems to be
great  value  in  systematically  considering  sub-
jective experience from the vantage of a third-
person  perspective,  and objective  reality  from
the vantage of a first-person perspective, which
are the goals of section 2 and section 3 respect-
ively.
3 Reflections on section 3: Gaining a 
third-person perspective on people’s 
first-person experience
In the second section of my paper I review re-
search that attempts to inform our understand-
ing  of  the  first-person  experience  using  the
third-person  perspective  of  science.  This  ap-
proach takes at its starting point a theoretical
distinction  between  experiential  consciousness
(corresponding to the contents of on-going ex-
periences)  and  meta-consciousness  (or  meta-
awareness—the terms are used interchangeably)
corresponding  to  the  explicit  re-representation
of  the  contents  of  experiential  consciousness.
These levels are illustrated by the case of mind-
wandering while reading. In this context, exper-
iential consciousness corresponds to the content
of the mind-wandering episode and meta-aware-
ness  is  initially  absent  but  suddenly  emerges
with the realization that one was mind-wander-
ing rather than attending to the text. 
An important  implication of  the  distinc-
tion  between  experiential  consciousness  and
meta-consciousness is that people can have ex-
periences  (e.g.,  mind-wandering)  that  they
either fail to notice explicitly (temporal dissoci-
ations) or notice but manage to mischaracterize
(translation dissociations). I review a program
of research that has fleshed out this distinction
in various contexts, with a particular focus on
mind-wandering.  Using assorted  methodologies
including  the  combination  of  experience
sampling  measures,  self-catching,  and  behavi-
oral  measures,  we  find  evidence  that  people
routinely fail to notice episodes of mind-wander-
ing but are nevertheless accurate at reporting it
when they are directly queried.2
2 A very recent paper (Seli et al. in press) suggests some variablity in
the accuracy of mind-wandering reports as assessed by the corres-
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Gottschling  devotes  the  bulk  of  her  re-
marks to discussing efforts to develop a third-
person science of first-person experience. In gen-
eral, she is sympathetic to the approach. How-
ever, she raises a variety of concerns and makes
a number of useful suggestions. As noted, I will
not endeavor to respond to all of her concerns;
however, there are several that stand out, and
so I will consider them in turn.
Gottschling’s  primary  reservation  about
the distinction between experiential  conscious-
ness and meta-awareness is that she is not per-
suaded  by  my characterization  of  experiential
consciousness. Essentially she does not see how
it is possible to “distinguish conscious processes
which are not accessed from unconscious activ-
ity”  (Gottschling this collection,  p.  11).  Al-
though it is true that there are some situations
where it may be difficult to distinguish experi-
enced  but  not  meta-aware  from  unconscious
processes (as in the case of potentially uncon-
scious emotions, see Schooler et al. 2015), often
this distinction is quite straightforward. For ex-
ample,  when people are surprised to suddenly
realize that they are mind-wandering instead of
paying attention to what they reading. In this
case, it is evident that they were experiencing
the contents of the mind-wandering as they are
typically able to report them. It is simply that
they had not engaged in the reflective process of
noting that they were mind-wandering instead
of reading. In short, Gottschling is unpersuaded
by a mental state—“conscious processes which
are not accessed”—that I never actually postu-
lated. Essentially, she layered onto the construct
the notion that experiential consciousness is not
accessed, and then criticized it for this reason.
In fact, although I am not committed to
the  notion  that  non-conscious  higher  order
thoughts  underpin  all  conscious  thoughts
(Rosenthal 1986), I have no problem with Gott-
schling’s attempted revision to my notion of ex-
periential consciousness, namely that it repres-
ents a third-order level of consciousness. Indeed
I have speculated about this possibility in the
pondence of such reports to behavioral indices of lapses. Neverthe-
less, people appear to have some access to when their reports are
likely to be more vs less accurate as evidenced by a significant correl-
ation between confidence in self-reports and correspondence to the
behavioral indices of mind-wandering.
past (see  Schooler et al. 2015). I am therefore
entirely comfortable with  Gottschling’s sugges-
tion  that  “meta-awareness  would  include  a
third-order state, in his terminology a re-re-rep-
resentation  whereas  the  experience  of  mind-
wandering  would  involve  only  a  second-order
state,  a  re-representation”  (this collection,  p.
16). Just so long as the second-order cognition
is not  experienced as a reflection about experi-
ence,  I  have no problems with whatever  non-
conscious  higher-order  cognitions  may  be  re-
quired to produce it. 
Although  Gottschling’s  concerns  with  the
notion of experiential  consciousness seem to be
largely a product of her reading into my distinc-
tion more than was intended, her suggestion that
it may be helpful to consider more fine-grained
levels of meta-awareness is a worthwhile idea that
merits  development.  As  Gottschling observes,
there is a need for “an improved taxonomy of dif-
ferent  kinds  of  reflection  and  ‘taking  stock’  ...
awareness itself might come in degrees and at dif-
ferently levels of representation” (this collection, p
20).  Indeed, one feature that has been notably
absent from my discussion of meta-consciousness
(here and elsewhere) is consideration of the pos-
sibility  of  monitoring  processes  that  may  take
place at the experiential level, without explicit re-
representation  at  the  meta-level  For  example,
sometimes when people are on-task they may ex-
perience a palpable sense of sustained attention
without having explicitly to note to themselves
that they are on-task. Similarly, when mind-wan-
dering, people sometimes report that they knew
they were mind-wandering. This awareness, how-
ever, may not necessarily be associated with an
explicit acknowledgment of that fact. Rather they
maintain  a  continuous  unstated  awareness  that
they are off-task. In short, a further distinction
may be needed between a non-propositional “feel-
ing of  awareness”  that  one is  doing  something
(“experiential monitoring”) and the verbal/ pro-
positional state of meta-awareness that may occur
when  people  intermittently  take  stock  of  their
mental  state,  as  when  one  suddenly  thinks  to
themselves, “Darn! I was mind-wandering again!” 
The notion that sometimes people explicitly
re-represent  their  state  to  themselves  (meta-
awareness) whereas other times they simply “just
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know” they are in that state (experiential monit-
oring) would also be consistent with alternative
mindfulness practices (Thompson 2014). For in-
stance, open-monitoring involves monitoring the
content  of  experience  from  moment-to-moment
without deliberately attending to any particular
object (Lutz et al. 2008). Open-monitoring cultiv-
ates an aspect of mindfulness described as “ob-
serving”, measured with items such as “When I
walk,  I  deliberately notice the sensation of  my
body moving” (Baer et al. 2006). This seems akin
to what I am referring to as experiential monitor-
ing.  A somewhat  different  practice  involves  la-
beling one’s experiences as they occur with short
tags like “thinking,” “feeling,” or “sensation.” This
cultivates  an  aspect  of  mindfulness  called  “de-
scribing”, measured with items such as: “My nat-
ural  tendency  is  to  put  my  experiences  into
words.” This process of re-representing experience
in words seems akin to meta-awareness. 
The distinction between experiential mon-
itoring and meta-awareness might also speak to
another  of  Gottschling’s  concerns,  namely  the
question of whether meta-awareness is necessar-
ily all-or-none (as I intimated) or more continu-
ous (as she proposes). Although research would
be required to tease out this conjecture, it seem
quite plausible to me that experiential monitor-
ing might take place at a continuous level with
individuals ranging from either dimly to expli-
citly aware of what they are doing. In contrast,
a more discrete process may occur when indi-
viduals suddenly realize that they are engaging
in a mental  state (e.g.,  mind-wandering)  that
they had not previously noticed. 
Several  other  concerns  that  Gottschling
raises about my paper, including the possibility
of unconscious emotions and how the distinction
between  experiential  consciousness  and  meta-
awareness relates  to other distinctions of  con-
sciousness  (including  those  of  Dehaene et  al.
2006;  Block 1995 and  Rosenthal 1986) are dis-
cussed in other locations (e.g.,  Schooler et al.
2015). While she points out a number of other
modest blemishes that I will not address, ulti-
mately the approach for gaining a third-person
perspective of first-person experience that I ar-
ticulated in section 2 of my paper appears logic-
ally intact.
4 Reflections on section 4: Toward a 
meta-perspective for considering the 
meta-physics of first- versus third- 
person perspective
Gottschling seems less optimistic about the con-
tribution of the third section of my paper. She
dismisses speculations I derive from considering
third-person science from the vantage of first-
person  experience,  as  a  “largely  unnecessary
strategic move” (Gottschling this collection, p.
1) that “does not seem to fit with the rest of
the project” (p. 22). I concur with Gottschling
that  first  person  experience  can  be  assessed
from  the  third  person  perspective  of  science
without also considering objective science from
a first-person  perspective.  In  the  past  I  have
routinely  considered  what  science  has  to  say
about first-person experience without consider-
ing  the  other  side  of  the  coin  (e.g.,  Schooler
2002; Schooler et al. 2011; Schooler et al. 2015).
Clearly the two sides of the discussion are not
logically co-dependent on one another. 
I acknowledge that the final section of the
paper was not necessary for shoring up any of my
arguments in the second section. Nevertheless I
maintain that it adds an important balance to the
discussion by illustrating the potential  value of
considering  both  first-  and  third-person  ap-
proaches from the vantage of the alternative per-
spective. In this concluding section of my paper, I
change my frame-of-reference from a third- to a
first-person perspective, and consider the current
assumptions  of  science  from  this  vantage.  I
identify three aspects of existence that I argue are
axiomatic from a first-person perspective, includ-
ing: the existence of experience, the flow of time,
and the fact that the present is qualitatively dif-
ferent from the past or the future. I argue that all
three of these essential elements are either unex-
plained by science (i.e.,  experience) or outright
discounted as an illusion of consciousness (i.e., the
flow of time, the privileged present).  I contend
that while many aspects of experience could be il-
lusory, it is hard (indeed impossible for me) to
conceive of how experience, the flow of time, or
the  privileged  nature  of  the  present  could  be
among them. On these grounds, I suggest that
there may be something missing from the current
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account of objective science and speculate that an
additional subjective dimension of time might fit
the bill. I argue that a subjective dimension of
time would provide: 1) a realm of reality for ex-
perience to reside, 2) the additional degree of free-
dom necessary to enable the flow of time in phys-
ics’ current “block universe”, and 3) a way to con-
ceptualize the present. I readily acknowledge that
such an account is highly speculative, but I offer
it as an example of the type of meta-perspective
that I think could emerge by attempting to recon-
cile the axioms required for both objective and
subjective frames-of-reference.
Gottschling’s  assessment  of  my arguments
in this section are largely a rehash of standard
critiques of the “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983)
and the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers
1996). The standard refrain is that the inability of
science to account for subjectivity corresponds to
an  epistemological  gap  not  an  ontological  one.
The fact that we cannot explain something, and
perhaps never will be able to, does not require us
to assume a different ontological foundation for
reality. I concede that this kind of mysterian (Mc-
Ginn 1989) account of the explanatory gap, al-
though profoundly unsatisfying, is difficult to dis-
pute. However, she largely ignores the more novel
aspects of my arguments. Namely, she disregards
my claim that not only is the current physicalist
account unable to explain consciousness, it out-
right rejects two additional subjectively self-evid-
ent aspects of reality. It rejects the flow of time
and  the  privileged  present.  While  she  acknow-
ledges in a footnote that she finds this aspect of
the  paper  “inspiring,”  it  does  not  impact  her
overall dismissal of the need for a meta-perspect-
ive. As she puts it, “what the proposed meta-per-
spective might be and how it is helpful despite ac-
knowledging our common sense intuition eludes
my understanding not at an epistemological level
but at an ontological level” (Gottschling this col-
lection, p. 23).
Gottschling’s reaction to the third section of
my paper was not unexpected. As I noted in the
close of my paper, “my arguments on this point
will  likely remain wholly unpersuasive to those
who cannot conceive of subjective experience as
offering an epistemological authority that rivals
science.”  I  recognize  that  it  will  be  an  uphill
battle  to  persuade  philosophers  and  scientists
steeped in the supremacy of the third-person per-
spective to consider that conclusions drawn from
our own experience could possibly carry ramifica-
tions  comparable  to  conventional  objective  sci-
ence. But at the end of the day all of the science
that we believe we know is necessarily delivered
to us through our subjective experience. While
what we know about objective reality is necessar-
ily dependent on experience, the same is not the
case for experience. Objective reality could con-
ceivably be an illusion. This could all be a dream
or we could be the proverbial brain in a vat. But
the  experience of objective reality is unquestion-
able, as even an illusory experience is still an ex-
perience.  Given that  the  existence  of  objective
reality is ultimately on less certain ground than
the existence of experience, it is far from obvious
why the third-person frame-of-reference holds its
current unchallenged dominion.
5 Conclusion
I suspect that my big-picture approach to reply-
ing to Gottschling’s very detailed analysis may
be unsatisfying to some (Gottschling included)
who might have expected point-by-point replies
to each of her concerns. However, I hope that
my stepping-back tactic enabled me to address
the  major  concerns  that  were  raised.  At  the
outset I  noted the close parallels  between the
factors that contribute to conceptual and per-
ceptual  processes.  In  addition to the value  of
perspective shifting, it might also be noted that
stepping-back is another strategy that is useful
in both conceptual and perceptual domains. For
example,  it  is  easier  to  decipher  a  highly
pixelated photo from a distance than up close.
Similarly, when people confront conceptual in-
sight problems from a more distant perspective
(e.g.,  imagining  themselves  a  year  from now)
they are often better able reach a solution (För-
ster et al. 2004). Conceptual stepping back can
enable  one  to  distinguish  the  metaphorical
“forest  from  the  trees.”  It  remains  unclear
whether  there  could  be  a  genuine  meta-per-
spective that enables us to accommodate the as-
sumptions of both the first- and third- person
perspectives. But if such a perspective does ex-
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ist,  it  seems likely that finding it will require
stepping back…way back.
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